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THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EVIDENCE COURSE: THE 
“PRELIMINARIES” TO HELPING STUDENTS DEVELOP THE 
SKILL OF IDENTIFYING NONHEARSAY 
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED* 
“The chief aid to [understanding] is order.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When the Law Journal kindly invited me to contribute to this special issue 
on teaching Evidence, my initial inclination was to write an article about the 
need to integrate teaching legisprudence, notably statutory interpretation, into 
the Evidence course.  I strongly believe that as a general proposition, the 
academy does a woefully inadequate job of preparing our students to practice 
in the Age of Statutes.2  Moreover, as a course, Evidence is uniquely well 
suited as a vehicle for teaching legisprudence.  In most contemporary Evidence 
courses, the primary focus is on the Federal Rules of Evidence.  They not only 
govern in federal practice, but in four-fifths of the states the legislature or 
judiciary has adopted an evidence code patterned directly after the Federal 
Rules.3  Most Articles of the Federal Rules function as self-contained codes.4  
In its landmark 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,5 the Supreme Court approvingly quoted the late Professor Edward 
Cleary’s statement that “[i]n principle, under the Federal Rules no common 
law of evidence remains.”6  In Justice Blackmun’s words, “the Rules occupy 
 
* Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California Davis; former Chair, Evidence 
Section, American Association of Law Schools. 
 1. SIMONIDES (c. 475 B.C.), quoted in THE MACMILLAN BOOK OF PROVERBS, MAXIMS, 
AND FAMOUS PHRASES 1729 (1965). 
 2. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (Burton 
Stevenson ed., 1982); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A More Modest Proposal Than a Common Law 
for the Age of Statutes: Greater Reliance in Statutory Interpretation on the Concept of 
Interpretative Intention, 68 ALB. L. REV. 949 (2005). 
 3. 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, Table of State and Military 
Adaptations of Federal Rules of Evidence, in WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE (Joseph M. 
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
 4. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second 
Revolution, 6 REV. LITIG. 129 (1987). 
 5. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 6. Id. at 588 (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51–52 (1984)). 
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the field.”7  However, Rules 301 on presumption,8 and 501 on privileges,9 
create windows to the common law.  Those statutes explicitly empower the 
courts to continue to evolve those bodies of doctrine by common-law process.  
Hence, the statutory scheme affords the teacher a unique opportunity to 
contrast jurisprudence with legisprudence. 
However, I resisted the temptation to write that article.  On several 
occasions in the past, I have made my views on that subject clear.10  I feel as 
strongly about the need to teach statutory interpretation in Evidence as I ever 
have, but I am afraid that I have beaten the subject to death.  I probably sound 
like a broken record.  Further, I would like to think that there is a growing 
realization of the need to teach legisprudence in the law school curriculum.  
Two of the earlier special teaching issues in this law review included articles 
on the wisdom of integrating statutory analysis into teaching Contracts11 and 
Criminal Law.12  I was gratified to see that Professor McMunigal’s article on 
Criminal Law relied in part on one of my earlier pieces advocating increased 
stress in teaching on legisprudence.13  In any event, I concluded that it was 
advisable to select a different topic.  That topic is the challenge of teaching law 
students how to recognize nonhearsay. 
II.  THE DAUNTING CHALLENGE OF HELPING LAW STUDENTS DEVELOP THE 
ANALYTIC SKILL OF DETERMINING WHETHER TESTIMONY ABOUT AN OUT-OF-
COURT DECLARATION AMOUNTS TO HEARSAY 
Teaching law students how to identify nonhearsay may be the most 
daunting pedagogic challenge in the Evidence course.  To begin with, each 
year law students taking Evidence complain about the difficulty of 
distinguishing between nonhearsay and hearsay.  To be sure, the students 
appreciate the importance of the distinction.  It is black letter law that 
 
 7. Id. at 587. 
 8. FED. R. EVID. 301. 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 10. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Integrate Legisprudence into the Evidence Course, 
in TEACHING THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM 193 (S. Friedland & G. Hess, eds. 2004); Edward 
J. Imwinkelried, Using the Evidence Course as a Vehicle for Teaching Legisprudential Skills, 21 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 907 (2003); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Pedagogy in the Age of 
Statutes, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 227 (1991).  In part because of those beliefs, the Evidence course 
book, which I co-author, places special emphasis on legisprudence.  See RONALD L. CARLSON, 
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EDWARD J. KIONKA & KRISTINE STRACHAN, EVIDENCE: TEACHING 
MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES (4th ed. 1997). 
 11. H. Miles Foy, III, Legislation and Pedagogy in Contracts 101, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1273 
(2000). 
 12. Kevin C. McMunigal, A Statutory Approach to Criminal Law, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1285 
(2004). 
 13. Id. at 1289 n.13 (citing Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using the Evidence Course as a Vehicle 
for Teaching Legisprudential Skills, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 907, 908 (2003)). 
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nonhearsay is admissible without the necessity to identify an applicable 
hearsay exception while hearsay is admissible only if the proponent can 
persuade the trial judge that the testimony falls within the scope of an 
exception.14  However, understanding the importance of a distinction does not 
make it any easier to grasp the distinction or to apply it in practice.  The typical 
law student can easily master most of the hearsay exceptions, since for better 
or worse, mastery to a large degree consists of memorizing the essential 
elements of the foundations for the various exceptions.  Many students 
struggle, though, in making the threshold determination of whether the 
testimony constitutes hearsay in the first instance. 
Moreover, Evidence teachers acknowledge the magnitude of the challenge.  
Evidence teachers often remark that perennially one of the most disappointing 
facets of the students’ performance on the final examination is their frequent 
inability to discern that although testimony in an examination question related 
to an out-of-court statement, nevertheless the testimony was not hearsay.  To 
address that problem, many, if not most, Evidence teachers spend a full class 
on an extended discussion of the hearsay definition and then devote at least one 
additional class session exclusively to analyzing problems posing the question 
of whether the proffered testimony constitutes hearsay.  Some employ 
Professor Morgan’s classic 1946 Summer Term Harvard Law School 
examination, including 75 fact situations prefaced by the question, “Which of 
the following items is hearsay?”15  Others have developed their own hearsay 
drills.16 
Finally, trial judges complain loudly about the bar’s lack of understanding 
of the narrow scope of the definition of hearsay.  Many a trial judge has told 
me that he or she hates to preside at a case with a “jack in the box” attorney 
who leaps up to object on hearsay grounds whenever the proponent’s question 
calls for an out-of-court statement—even when it is patent that the testimony 
will qualify as nonhearsay.  Of course, if that type of attorney wears on the 
judge’s patience, the average juror will similarly find the attorney irritating.  
The attorney is wasting the jury’s time by constantly interrupting to interject 
hearsay objections and regularly being overruled by a sometimes obviously 
exasperated judge. 
In sum, every affected constituency—law students, Evidence teachers, and 
judges—would likely agree that in Evidence, we must do a better job of 
teaching students how to differentiate between hearsay and nonhearsay.  Many 
trial attorneys have an inadequate understanding of the scope of the hearsay 
 
 14. FED. R. EVID. 802–04, 807. 
 15. JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 133–37 (10th ed. 
2004). 
 16. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 457–61 (problems 18–13(a)–(w)). 
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definition, and to some extent that reflects the difficulty of the teaching 
challenge. 
In this short Article, I do not intend to discuss what to teach about the 
hearsay definition or how to teach it.  Rather, I would like to discuss when to 
teach that subject.  In general, should the Evidence teacher discuss the hearsay 
definition early or late in the course?  More specifically, what evidentiary 
topics ought to precede that discussion in the Evidence course? 
III.  THE TEMPTATION TO TEACH THE HEARSAY DEFINITION EARLY IN THE 
EVIDENCE COURSE 
There are exceptions to the rule,17 but for the most part, Evidence 
coursebooks tend to take up the subject of hearsay relatively early.18  For 
several reasons, that tendency is understandable. 
One reason is that the hearsay coverage tends to be the lengthiest topic in 
the course and it makes sense to try to get that topic out of the way early on.  
Once the teacher has finished the discussion of that topic, the teacher has a 
better sense of how much is left for the rest, residue, and remainder, that is, the 
shorter discussions in the course.  The typical Evidence coursebook devotes 
more pages to the topic of hearsay than to any other subject.19  One coursebook 
includes more than 500 pages on the various aspects of the hearsay doctrine.20  
Another sets aside almost 350 pages to the topic.21  Especially given the 
difficulty of teaching the skill of recognizing nonhearsay, at the beginning of 
the course it can be hard to predict how many class hours will have to be spent 
on hearsay.  Since by far hearsay is the largest topic in the course, it would be 
 
 17. RONALD J. ALLEN, RICHARD B. KUHNS & ELEANOR SWIFT, EVIDENCE: TEXT, 
PROBLEMS, AND CASES ch. 8 (3d ed. 2002); KENNETH S. BROUN, ROBERT P. MOSTELLER & 
PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 13 (6th ed. 2002); RICHARD O. 
LEMPERT, SAMUEL R. GROSS & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: 
TEXT, PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES ch. 6 (3d ed. 2000); JACK B. WEINSTEIN, JOHN H. 
MANSFIELD, NORMAN ABRAMS & MARGARET A. BERGER, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 
ch. 4 (9th ed. 1997). 
 18. DAVID P. LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH ch. 3 
(2004); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES: 
TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS ch. 3 (5th ed. 2004); PAUL R. RICE & ROY A. KATRIEL, 
EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE ch. 4 (5th ed. 2005); PAUL F. 
ROTHSTEIN, MYRNA S. RAEDER & DAVID CRUMP, EVIDENCE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS ch. 3 (2d ed. 1998); WALTZ & PARK, supra note 15, at ch. 3; OLIN GUY WELLBORN 
III, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ch. 2 (3d ed. 2003). 
 19. See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 17; GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE (2002); ERIC D. 
GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 
1994). 
 20. RICE & KATRIEL, supra note 18, at 283–784. 
 21. DENNIS D. PRATER, DANIEL J. CAPRA, STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & CHRISTINE M. 
ARGUELLO, EVIDENCE: THE OBJECTION METHOD 509–850 (2d ed. 2002). 
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foolish to leave that topic to the very end of the course.  The teacher could 
easily run out of time and have to altogether forego the discussion of a number 
of important evidentiary topics. 
Further, students are eager to reach the topic of hearsay because it is 
perhaps the evidentiary doctrine that television and the movies have given 
them the most exposure to.  By the time they enroll in law school, students 
have probably seen several depictions of trials in which an attorney made a 
technical hearsay objection to obstruct the search for truth.  The experienced 
Evidence teacher wants to begin the course with a high level of student 
interest, and he or she can do so by capitalizing on the students’ interest in the 
topic of hearsay. 
Finally, from a selfish perspective, raising the topic of hearsay allows the 
Evidence teacher to discuss constitutional law decisions that the teacher finds 
intellectually stimulating.  In their heart of hearts, most law teachers fancy 
themselves as constitutional law scholars, and more than any other evidentiary 
topic, hearsay interfaces with constitutional law.  Many of the foremost 
modern Evidence scholars such as Professors Richard Friedman and Robert 
Mosteller write frequently about that interface.22  The Supreme Court’s 
celebrated 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington23 is only the most recent 
in a long line of Confrontation Clause24 cases imposing restrictions on the 
admissibility of prosecution hearsay.25  The Crawford Court’s theory of 
“testimonial statements” can potentially have a broad impact on the general 
admissibility of hearsay in criminal cases.26  In addition, there are 
constitutional constraints on several other aspects of hearsay doctrine, such as 
tacit admissions,27 vicarious admissions,28 and the unavailability standard for 
the former testimony hearsay exception.29  Some Evidence coursebooks have 
separate chapters discussing the interface between hearsay doctrine and 
 
 22. E.g., Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores 
Confrontation Clause Protection, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2004, at 4; Robert P. Mosteller, 
Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 511 (2005). 
 23. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 25. E.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); 
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Mancusi v. 
Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 
314 (1969); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). 
 26. See generally Crawford Symposium, 20-SUM Crim. Just. 5 (2005).  The various articles 
identify a number of constitutional law issues that are left unresolved after Crawford.  Needless to 
say, those issues are fodder for class discussion. 
 27. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617–18 (1976). 
 28. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135–37 (1968). 
 29. Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 204. 
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constitutional law.30  What would the typical Evidence scholar more enjoy 
teaching: the interpretation of the dead men’s statutes or the growing 
controversy over the application of Crawford to dying declarations?  The 
Evidence teacher is probably correct in thinking that the latter topic will lend 
itself to a livelier class discussion.31 
For all of these reasons, it is tempting for the Evidence teacher to take up 
the topic of hearsay, including the recognition of nonhearsay, sooner rather 
than later. 
IV.  THE CASE FOR COVERING THE HEARSAY RULE SOMEWHAT LATER IN THE 
EVIDENCE COURSE—THE HELPFUL “PRELIMINARIES” TO ATTEMPTING TO 
TEACH THE STUDENTS HOW TO RECOGNIZE NONHEARSAY 
The thesis of this Article is that on balance, it is advisable for the Evidence 
teacher to turn to the topic of hearsay somewhat later in the course.  More 
specifically, this Article argues that there are several topics that are natural 
“preliminaries” to the discussion of nonhearsay.  It is submitted that if the 
Evidence teacher covers these topics before shifting to hearsay, his or her 
students will be in a markedly better position to master the analytic skill of 
making the threshold determination whether testimony about an out-of-court 
statement constitutes hearsay.  Those four “preliminary” topics are: the 
competency of prospective witnesses; the authentication of evidence; logical 
relevance, notably non-character theories; and the best evidence rule. 
A. The Competency of Prospective Witnesses 
Many Evidence coursebooks cover the topic of witness competency after 
the analysis of hearsay.32  However, reversing that sequence can make it easier 
for the students to develop the skill of determining whether testimony falls 
within the definition of hearsay. 
Today the conventional wisdom is that the primary rationale for the 
hearsay rule is safeguarding the opportunity for cross-examination.33  
Modernly, we limit the scope of the definition of hearsay to assertive 
statements.34  That limitation generally excludes exclamatory, imperative, and 
interrogatory sentences from the definition: 
 
 30. LEMPERT ET AL., supra note 17, at ch. 7; PRATER ET AL., supra note 21, at ch. 15; 
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 18, at ch. 7. 
 31. Please pardon the weak pun. 
 32. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 18, at ch. 6; RICE & KATRIEL, supra note 18, at 
ch. 6; ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 18, at ch. 9; WALTZ & PARK, supra note 15, at ch. 9; 
WELLBORN, supra note 18, at ch. 4. 
 33. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245, at 94–95 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). 
 34. FED. R. EVID. 801(a). 
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The justification for the [hearsay] rule is guaranteeing the opposing party an 
opportunity to cross-examine to expose latent weaknesses in sincerity, 
perception, memory, or narration.  Certain types of sentences are usually 
immune to such weaknesses.  For example, if upon observing [a] collision . . . 
a bystander utters the exclamation “My God!”, there is little reason to be 
concerned about latent weaknesses in testimonial qualities.  Realistically, this 
type of statement is not testable by cross-examination; there is ordinarily no 
serious question about the person’s perception or memory when the testimony 
takes the form of an exclamatory, imperative, or interrogatory sentence.35 
Similarly, the hearsay definition does not encompass testimony about out-of-
court statements when the statement is logically relevant for a nonhearsay 
purpose, that is, on a theory of logical relevance that does not depend on the 
truth of the assertion for its probative worth.36  Again, that restriction on the 
scope of the definition is traceable to cross-examination policy.  When the 
statement is relevant regardless of its truth, there is no need to cross-examine 
the out-of-court declarant.37  On a nonhearsay theory such as a verbal act, it is 
logically relevant that the statement was made; and for that purpose, it is 
sufficient to afford the opposing attorney an opportunity to question the in-
court witness who heard the statement. 
The student will grasp the cross-examination policy underlying the 
definition of hearsay much more readily if he or she has already been exposed 
to the topic of competency of witnesses.  At common law, to be a competent 
witness, a person had to possess four testimonial qualities: perception, 
memory, narrative ability, and sincerity.38  The common law imposed those 
requirements because it viewed those qualities as the most fundamental 
determinants of the reliability of a witness’s testimony.  Of course, the value of 
cross-examination lies in its ability to expose “latent weaknesses”39 in those 
qualities, which were not evident during the witness’s direct examination.  If 
the student has already studied the competency standards, the student can 
discern that cross-examination is a tool for revealing a witness’s deficiencies 
with respect to the most fundamental guarantees of the trustworthiness of the 
witness’s testimony. 
Moreover, in studying the definition of hearsay, it is an advantage if the 
student has already learned not only that there were common-law competency 
criteria but that those criteria were rather lax.40  As the Advisory Committee’s 
Note accompanying Federal Rule of Evidence 601 observes, “few witnesses” 
 
 35. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 435. 
 36. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 37. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 441. 
 38. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 33, § 62, at 245–46. 
 39. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 435. 
 40. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 33, § 62, at 247. 
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were disqualified under the common-law standards.41  If expert testimony 
clearly established that the prospective witness was suffering from retrograde 
amnesia that affected the time period of the relevant events, the witness might 
be ruled incompetent.  However, if the person’s recollection was merely very 
hazy, the trial judge is likely to overrule any objection and hold that the 
witness’s deficiencies cut to the weight of the witness’s testimony rather than 
rendering the witness altogether incompetent.  In other words, even at common 
law the competency standards did not screen out all witnesses with serious 
deficiencies in perception, memory, narrative ability, or sincerity.  Even if 
there was grave doubt about the prospective witness’s testimonial qualities, in 
all probability the person would be permitted to take the witness stand.  If the 
student realizes that persons with severe deficiencies in their testimonial 
qualities are routinely allowed to testify, the student will view the chance to 
cross-examine as all the more critical.  In turn, that view will help the students 
understand why cross-examination policy largely dictates the various elements 
of the definition of hearsay. 
B. The Authentication of Evidence 
The first element in defining hearsay is that the testimony must concern an 
assertive out-of-court statement.42  Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a) provides: 
“A ‘statement’ is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a 
person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.”43 
Introducing the student to the authentication doctrine before discussing 
hearsay assists the student in mastering this element of the hearsay definition.  
What is the authentication doctrine, and how does one go about determining 
whether an item of evidence is authentic?  In the final analysis, authentication 
is not establishing that an item of evidence is what it purports to be but, rather, 
proving that the item is what the proponent claims it to be.44  By way of 
example, consider a forgery prosecution.  Suppose that at trial, the prosecutor 
proffers the alleged forged document.  The last thing that the prosecutor wants 
to do is to prove that the document is what it purports to be.  The document 
might purport to be a genuine promissory note.  If the prosecutor proved that 
the document was what it purported to be, the prosecutor would prove himself 
or herself out of court and establish the accused’s innocence.  Under the 
substantive law of forgery the prosecutor has to claim that the document is not 
what it purports to be, and the prosecutor may have to offer foundational 
testimony such as a questioned document analysis45 to prove up the claim.  Of 
 
 41. FED. R. EVID. 601 Advisory Committee’s Note. 
 42. FED. R. EVID. 801(a). 
 43. Id. 
 44. FED. R. EVID. 901(a). 
 45. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3). 
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course, even in these cases the proponent’s analysis begins by studying the 
facial aspect of the evidence.  In order to prove forgery, the prosecutor must 
demonstrate that the writing has a certain facial appearance due to the 
defendant’s forgery. 
In more typical cases, the starting point for authentication analysis, careful 
examination of the facial aspect of the item of evidence, is even more 
important; this examination is both the starting point and the terminus of the 
analysis.  The proponent usually claims that the item is what it purports to be.  
To determine the item’s purport, the proponent must subject the facial aspect 
of the item to a painstaking analysis.  In many instances, the authentication of a 
writing boils down to proof of the document’s authorship.  Who is the 
purported author of the writing?  Was the writing purportedly issued by the 
parent corporation or a subsidiary?46  In some instances, the proponent 
attempts to establish the authorship of an unsigned writing by proving that the 
contents of the writing disclose information known only to the claimed 
author.47  When the proponent relies on this authentication technique, the 
proponent must closely scrutinize the facial aspect of the writing: Precisely 
what information does the writing contain? 
Most Evidence coursebooks cover the authentication doctrine after 
hearsay.48  However, covering authentication before hearsay can help the 
students learn how to determine whether an out-of-court statement is assertive.  
In most cases, the key to making the determination is painstaking analysis of 
the facial aspect of the out-of-court statement.  The analysis is strikingly 
parallel to the analysis in authentication. 
As in authentication, the starting point is a careful study of the face of the 
out-of-court statement.  For the most part, exclamatory, imperative, and 
interrogatory statements fall outside the scope of the hearsay definition 
because, as previously stated, they cannot meaningfully be tested by cross-
examination.49  On their face, these types of sentences usually do not declare 
any fact that is susceptible of being true or false.50 
 
 46. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).  That distinction could determine whether the witness called to lay 
the authentication foundation is a “qualified witness” within the intendment of that expression in 
this subsection of Rule 803. 
 47. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) (“contents”); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 33, § 
225, at 49. 
 48. FISHER, supra note 19, ch. 10; MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: AN INTRODUCTORY 
PROBLEM APPROACH, ch. 10 (2002); GREEN & NESSON, supra note 19, ch. 9; MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 18, ch. 13; RICE & KATRIEL, supra note 18, ch. 7; ROTHSTEIN ET AL., 
supra note 18, ch. 15; WELLBORN, supra note 18, ch. 6. 
 49. United States v. Wright, 343 F.3d 849, 865 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A] question is typically not 
hearsay because it does not assert the truth or falsity of a fact.  A question merely seeks answers 
and usually has no factual content.”); United States v. Daniels, 48 F. App’x. 409, 412 (3d Cir. 
2002) (“[T]he federal courts of appeal are in agreement that interrogative statements cannot 
constitute hearsay because they do not assert the existence of facts . . . .”); Servants of the 
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The parallel to authentication analysis continues, though.  As we have 
seen, in some authentication cases an examination of the facial aspect of the 
item of evidence does not conclude the analysis.  In the forgery prosecution, 
the prosecutor begins by subjecting the purported promissory note to that mode 
of analysis; but the prosecutor must go beyond the face of the exhibit to 
develop the claim that the writing is a forgery.  For purposes of hearsay 
analysis, the starting rule of thumb is that purportedly exclamatory, imperative, 
and interrogatory sentences are not hearsay assertions.  However, as in 
authentication analysis, the hearsay analyst must sometimes go beyond the 
facial aspect of the out-of-court statement to make the threshold determination 
of whether the out-of-court statement is hearsay.  Ultimately, the question is 
whether the statement that the proponent is eliciting is functionally a 
declarative assertion.51  Assume, for example, that in a drug prosecution, the 
prosecutor called a percipient witness to a drug transaction.  The prosecutor 
attempts to elicit the witness’s testimony that one of the alleged drug 
traffickers said, “Hand me the baggie of marijuana.”  On its face, the sentence 
is imperative, not declarative; the declarant is ordering the listener to perform 
an act.  However, what the prosecutor is really interested in is the elliptical 
assertion embedded in the imperative sentence: “[T]he baggie [contains] 
marijuana.”  At trial, the prosecutor might not even try to elicit the complete 
sentence.  Rather, the prosecutor might ask: “How did Ms. Folsom describe the 
bag that she pointed to?”  The only words the prosecutor is interested in are 
“the baggie of marijuana.” 
While studying authentication, the student learns the importance of 
pausing to painstakingly analyze the facial aspect of the item of evidence.  
Concededly, in some cases, that is not the end of the analysis; but it is always 
the starting point.  The student can profitably apply that same lesson in hearsay 
analysis.  To decide whether the out-of-court statement is hearsay, once again 
the student ought to begin by carefully examining the facial aspect of the 
evidence.  As under authentication, that examination may not be the end of the 
analysis; but it should always be the starting point.  A student who has already 
learned the value of facial analysis in authentication should be able to more 
quickly discern its parallel importance under the hearsay doctrine. 
 
Paraclete, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1560, 1567 (D.N.M. 1994) (“[I]nquiries are 
not hearsay because . . . they are not assertions.”); CARLSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 435.  See 
generally Roger C. Park, “I Didn’t Tell Them Anything About You”: Implied Assertions as 
Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L. REV. 783 (1990). 
 50. Craig v. State, 630 N.E.2d 207, 211 (Ind. 1994). 
 51. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 436. 
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C. Logical Relevance, Including Non-character Theories of Logical 
Relevance 
There is virtual unanimity that the Evidence teacher should introduce the 
students to the concept of logical relevance before turning to hearsay.52  That is 
certainly a sound sequence.  After deciding that the out-of-court statement is 
assertive, the student must next resolve the question under Federal Rule 801(c) 
of whether the testimony about the statement is being offered for a hearsay 
purpose, that is, to prove the truth of the assertion.  Of course, that question is 
simply another way of asking whether the proponent is offering the testimony 
on a theory of logical relevance which requires an assumption of the truth of 
the assertion.  The student cannot intelligently address the Rule 801(c) 
question unless he or she understands logical relevance under Rule 401. 
However, there is a particular application of the logical relevance doctrine 
that is strikingly parallel to the logical relevance component of hearsay 
analysis: the determination of whether evidence of uncharged misconduct 
proffered under Federal Rule 404(b) possesses genuine non-character logical 
relevance.  In pertinent part, Rule 404(b) reads: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.  It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident . . . .53 
The first sentence of the statute codifies the traditional character evidence 
prohibition.  That sentence forbids the proponent from (1) offering testimony 
about a person’s other misdeeds to prove the person’s propensity or disposition 
for misconduct and (2) then inferring that on the occasion in question, the 
person acted “in character,” consistently with his or her character trait.  
However, the second sentence allows the proponent to introduce the evidence 
so long as he or she can point to a tenable theory of non-character logical 
relevance.  Every federal court of appeals has construed the second sentence as 
codifying the inclusionary conception of the uncharged misconduct doctrine.  
By virtue of that conception of the doctrine, the proponent may rely on any 
noncharacter theory even if it is not one of the enumerated theories such as 
“motive.”54  Thus, in studying Rule 404(b), the student quickly learns that 
there is a huge reward for imaginative logical relevance analysis.  If the 
proponent is creative enough to articulate a non-character theory of logical 
 
 52. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 17, ch. 3; FISHER, supra note 19, chs. 1–3; GRAHAM, supra 
note 48, ch. 2; GREEN & NESSON, supra note 19, ch. 2; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 
18, ch. 2; RICE & KATRIEL, supra note 18, ch. 2; ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 18, ch. 2; WALTZ 
& PARK, supra note 15, ch. 2. 
 53. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 54. 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 2:31 (2003). 
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relevance, the proponent can ordinarily easily defeat a character evidence 
objection. 
Of course, there is a direct parallel to hearsay analysis under Rule 801(c).  
If the proponent offers the out-of-court statement on a theory of logical 
relevance requiring an assumption of the truth of the assertion, the proponent 
walks right into a hearsay objection.  However, when the proponent is 
imaginative enough to find an alternative theory of logical relevance, the 
proponent can turn aside the hearsay objection.  Rule 404(b) analysis teaches 
the student the practical value of wracking one’s brain to develop multiple 
theories of logical relevance.  If the student comes to Rule 801(c) analysis with 
that mindset, the student is much more likely to work harder to find viable 
nonhearsay theories.  As previously stated, modern Evidence coursebooks 
broach the general topic of logical relevance before taking up the hearsay 
doctrine.55  However, several of them delay a consideration of non-character 
theories until after the discussion of the hearsay doctrine.56  Reversing that 
sequence would ensure that even before studying the Rule 801(c) component 
of the hearsay definition, the student has begun to form a mindset to develop 
multiple theories of logical relevance for an item of evidence.  The student 
would already know that doing so is the best method of defeating a character 
evidence objection.  The student can then more readily understand that this is 
also often the most effective method of surmounting a hearsay objection. 
D. The Best Evidence Rule 
If the teacher covers witness competency early, the student will have a 
better appreciation of the cross-examination policy which helps shape the 
definition of hearsay.  By studying authentication, the student learns the 
importance of facial analysis that is so critical under Rule 801(a).  Next, if he 
or she has already studied non-character theories of logical relevance, the 
student will come to the study of Rule 801(c) with an understanding of the 
practical importance of identifying multiples theories of logical relevance.  
Sequencing the course to cover those topics early should shorten the student’s 
learning curve on the challenge of determining whether testimony is 
nonhearsay.  However, there is one other topic that the teacher ought to 
seriously consider covering before hearsay: the best evidence rule.  The overall 
flow of best evidence analysis is quite analogous to the sequence of hearsay 
analysis.  If the teacher exposes the student to the flow of best evidence 
analysis before turning to hearsay, the student should find it much easier to 
grasp the sequence of hearsay analysis.  The vast majority of Evidence 
 
 55. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 56. GRAHAM, supra note 48, ch. 9; LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 18, ch. 4; ROTHSTEIN ET 
AL., supra note 18, ch. 8; WALTZ & PARK, supra note 15, ch. 4; WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 
17, ch. 5. 
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coursebooks discuss the best evidence rule after the hearsay doctrine,57 but 
there is a strong case for reversing that sequence. 
Consider the series of questions that the student must grapple with in order 
to assess a best evidence objection: 
First, the student must address the what question: What evidence is the 
proponent offering, and does that evidence relate to a “writing” under Federal 
Rule 1001(1)?  If the testimony does not relate to documentary subject-matter, 
the trial judge overrules the objection. 
Second, assuming that the testimony relates to a writing, the student must 
consider the why question: Is the proponent offering the testimony “[t]o prove 
the content of [the] writing” under Rule 1002?  The proponent can offer 
testimony to prove the existence, execution, or delivery of a writing without 
triggering the best evidence rule.58  So long as the proponent can advance a 
theory of logical relevance that does not necessitate proof of the contents of the 
writing, the best evidence rule does not come into play. 
Of course, when the testimony relates to a writing and the proponent’s 
purpose is proving the contents of the writing, the best evidence rule is 
triggered.  The general procedural consequence is that the proponent must 
produce the writing.  However, there are exceptional situations in which the 
proponent can dispense with the writing.  In those situations, the proponent 
must do two things: (1) establish an excuse for the non-production of the 
writing;59 and (2) offer an acceptable type of secondary evidence such as a 
certified copy of a public record60 or the testimony of a witness who previously 
read the reading and presently recalls its substance.61  The excuse for non-
production establishes the necessity for resorting to the secondary evidence, 
and the testimony about the secondary evidence demonstrates its authenticity 
or reliability.  In other words, the common denominators in these exceptional 
situations are the factors of necessity and reliability. 
The flow of hearsay analysis is essentially the same.  As in best evidence 
analysis, initially the student poses the what question: Does the testimony 
relate to an out-of-court assertion?  If that question is answered in the 
affirmative, the student next takes up the why question: Why is the proponent 
offering this testimony?  What is the proponent’s theory of logical relevance?  
Does that theory require the assumption of the truth of the assertion?  When 
 
 57. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 17, ch. 9; CARLSON ET AL., supra note 10, ch. 24; FISHER, 
supra note 19, ch. 10; GRAHAM, supra note 48, ch. 7; GREEN & NESSON, supra note 19, ch. 9; 
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 18, ch. 14; RICE & KATRIEL, supra note 18, ch. 7; 
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 18, ch. 15; WALTZ & PARK, supra note 15, ch. 8; WELLBORN, 
supra note 18, ch. 7. 
 58. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 33, § 233, at 66. 
 59. FED. R. EVID. 1004. 
 60. FED. R. EVID. 1005. 
 61. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 33, § 241, at 83. 
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testimony relates to a writing and the proponent is offering the testimony to 
prove the contents of the writing, the best evidence rule comes into play, 
generally mandating that the proponent produce the writing in court.  Its 
production enables the jury to read the writing with its own two eyes.  When 
testimony relates to an assertion and the proponent is attempting to introduce 
the testimony to establish the truth of the assertion, the hearsay rule comes into 
play, generally mandating that the proponent produce the declarant in court.  
The production of the declarant in court enables the jurors to hear the witness’s 
statements with their own ears and simultaneously to gauge the witness’s 
honesty and intelligence. 
Just as the preference for the original writing in best evidence sometimes 
yields, allowing the proponent to introduce secondary evidence, the preference 
for the declarant’s production can give way, permitting the proponent to 
introduce testimony about an out-of-court assertion under a hearsay exception.  
In the final analysis, the policy rationale for the recognition of most hearsay 
exceptions is the same as the justification for the admission of secondary 
evidence under the best evidence: a combination of the factors of necessity and 
reliability.  One of the most important insights underlying Dean Wigmore’s 
synthesis of hearsay doctrine was that those factors rationalized the vast 
majority of the recognized hearsay exceptions.62  The upshot is that drilling the 
students on the sequence of best evidence analysis is excellent preparation for 
employing essentially the same sequence of analysis required by the hearsay 
doctrine. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is understandable that so many Evidence teachers cover hearsay 
relatively early in their course.  It makes administrative sense to get the largest 
instructional block out of the way early.  Moreover, there is a certain eagerness 
to get to hearsay quickly because of the exciting, related constitutional law 
controversies. 
However, the fundamental question is which sequence of coverage makes 
the most sense pedagogically.  The premise of this Article is that the most 
daunting challenge for the Evidence teacher is to help students develop the 
analytic skill of differentiating between hearsay and nonhearsay.  On that 
premise, it may be wiser to position the hearsay rule a bit later in the course.  
More specifically, before taking up the hearsay rule, it seems advisable to 
cover topics which will give the students understandings and skills that will 
later enable them to more effectively meet the challenge of identifying 
nonhearsay. 
 
 62. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1420, at 202–03 (3d ed. 1940). 
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As previously stated, prior exposure to the common law criteria for witness 
competency teaches the students the fundamental importance of cross-
examination policy.  Understanding this policy enables students to better 
appreciate the contours of the definition of hearsay.  When they apply that 
definition, the students must initially inquire whether the out-of-court 
statement is assertive.  Their best starting point for this step is painstaking 
examination of the facial aspect of the testimony—a skill they learn in 
studying the authentication doctrine.  The student’s next step in applying the 
definition is identifying all the possible theories of logical relevance for the 
evidence and deciding whether every theory requires an assumption of the 
truth of the assertion.  If even one theory of logical relevance does not entail 
that assumption, there is an available nonhearsay theory that can overcome a 
hearsay objection.  Lastly, if the testimony falls within the hearsay definition, 
the student must search for an applicable hearsay exception founded on 
reliability and necessity.  The overall sequence of hearsay analysis is strikingly 
similar to the flow of best evidence analysis, and the student may be more 
comfortable following the flow of hearsay analysis if he or she has already 
mastered the best evidence rule. 
The point of this Article is not to recommend one coursebook over any 
other.63  A professor using a particular coursebook does not have to begin on 
page one and mechanically cover the pages in order.  The professor can vary 
the sequence.  Whenever I have used a coursebook, I have always deviated 
from the order of the chapters.  The point of this Article simply relates to the 
sequence of the class discussions.  Again, my assumption is that the thorniest 
pedagogical problem for the Evidence teacher is helping the students identify 
nonhearsay.  The reader’s experience might well be different.  If the reader has 
found another aspect of the Evidence course to be more troublesome, the 
reader can summarily dismiss this Article.  However, during the past thirty 
years, my conversations with colleagues, students, and judges lead me to 
conclude that many share my belief that differentiating between hearsay and 
nonhearsay is the most difficult challenge for our students.  If that belief is 
correct, to a significant degree the Evidence course ought to be sequenced to 
better equip our students to meet that challenge.  To borrow a phrase from 
Simonides, “[t]he chief aid” in teaching nonhearsay can be the right “order.”64 
 
 63. I must confess that in one respect, even the coursebook which I co-author does not 
follow the sequence recommended in this Article.  In our coursebook, the chapters on the hearsay 
doctrine precede the single chapter devoted to the best evidence rule.  See CARLSON ET AL., supra 
note 10. 
 64. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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